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Abstract 
EU member states do not get much from participating in a regional trade agreement and 
economic integration regime: beside the questionable effects on growth perspectives (€-
area grew since 1960 with a gradually smaller rate than the world economy), there is a clear 
evidence for a profound, unpleasant, structural change regarding convergence. During the 
first two decades of the period we studied, the coefficient of variation of per capita (p.c.) 
GDP  fell  strongly  and  labour  remuneration  grew  substantially  relative  to  non-labour 
income. Yet, this picture changed after 1980! The previous trend of closing the gap among 
the countries reversed completely: in 2005, coefficient of variation grew back to the levels 
of 1960. At the same time, all previous gains of labour vanished: in the period 1980-2005 
real wages lost about 35% against p.c. GDP. A persisting period of continuous divergence 
emerged after 1980, probably due to permanent, structural developments!  
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1. Introduction 
Regarding the effectiveness of internationalisation, the neoclassical paradigm  can be 
summarized as follow: opening the  markets and enhancing the degree of international 
competition will boost economic growth and initiate convergence. Since the 1980s, a 
vigorous discussion was developed (Romer 1986) concerning the empirical investigation of 
growth effects resulting from trade, as well as the convergence tendencies in a 
progressively globalised environment. Subjective reasons –  answering the specific 
questions relates strongly to various socio-political interests – but also objective ones, like 
differences in the underlying theoretical assumptions, the variables used, the sample and the 
statistical data, as well as the econometric techniques applied, generated a variety of partly 
controversial empirical results and arguments.  
For instance, although the dominant position in the relevant literature seems to be that trade 
contributes significantly to the strengthening of growth, there are plenty of other studies, 
which either show no relation, or, worst, relate trade and growth in a significantly negative 
way. Both, the sign and the causality of the effects, vary with respect to country and to time 
period (Khalafalla and Webb, 2001), meaning that a range of time and region specific 
socio-economic conditions are of great importance (Levine and Renelt, 1992 and Chuang 
2002).
1
In the European Union itself, a region of gradually strengthening internationalisation, 
member states do not get much from participating in a regional trade agreement and 
economic integration regime. For instance, let us proceed with a quite simplistic 
comparison: we estimate the growth rate of EU-15 and €-area, related to the growth rate of 
world economy, over time, during the gradual completion of European Union.
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Diagram 1: Growth rates in EU-15 and €-area, relative to the world economy. 
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The estimates presented in table A.1 in appendix are convincing: €-area and 7 countries 
show an increasing hysterisis compared to the world-wide growth rates: Austria (ADF 
estimation), Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (trend coefficients, 
estimated by KPSS  method,  are  significantly  negative). The opposite is true only for 
Luxemburg, the exceptional case of Ireland and the UK, which is relatively less integrated. 
                                                 
1 Kali et al. (2007) gather all different thinkable reasons for having diversified empirical results. They refer to 
the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991), Matsuyama (1992), Walde and Wood (2005), Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2001) and Yanikkaya (2003). 
2 This should be understood as an effort to depict the relative growth perspectives of EU, and not as a 
thorough study of trade / growth relations. First, the simplicity of our approach does not allow such reasoning. 
Even more, the evolution of growth rates in EU could be seen as the effect of creating a regional economic 
union, and not necessarily as the effect of an unlimited internationalisation process.    
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If anything,  it seems that, despite (or because of) a regionally constrained process of 
internationalisation, the prospects of €-area to grow have been affected in a negative way.
3
On the other hand, the literature on convergence is even more contradictory! Some authors 
concentrate on σ-convergence in Europe and provide evidence for closing the gaps. Yin et 
al. (2003) study σ-convergence of real GDP per capita for the period 1960-1995. Driven by 
the different integration levels within this period, they distinguish among  EU-6, EU-9, 
EU-12 and EU-15 and provide evidence for convergence, except for the period 1980-1985. 
Also Hoen (2000), who uses data on six core European countries (Germany, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark), provides results, which are in accordance with the 
neoclassical paradigm: GDP per capita is converging in the period 1970-1985. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995) found the same, among European regions for a wider period 
(1950-1990). Veiga (1999), who focuses on 12 European countries with regions belonging 
at the NUTS II level, provides also evidence for convergence till the late 1970s.  
 
On the contrary, a wide range of studies reject the convergence hypothesis for the European 
Union. Most of them show an unclear development of standard deviation in time,
4
The contradictory results arises from using dissimilar sets of countries, but, basically, from 
covering  different  time periods.
 while 
others (for instance, Neven 1995) identify different patterns of convergence in northern and 
southern Europe, especially during the period 1975-1990.  
5  The picture we get from  the  aforementioned  relevant 
studies is that something is going on with the 1980s! Many of the researches anticipated it,
6 
but they thought of it as the result of a temporary effect: the big 1980-1982 recession, 
resulting from the continuously growing oil’s prices, or the accession of southern European 
countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain),
7
In the present paper, the European Union serves as a historical experiment for the formation 
of a nearly perfectly internationalised environment. Bearing in mind the subsequent 
institutional steps that have been taken in the last 5 decades, we consider EU-15 as the 
outcome of a regionally evolving internationalisation process.
 were thought to be the underlying reasons. Truly, 
this could be a conclusion for someone who covers a period lasting, the most, till the 
beginning of the 1990s. In the present paper, we take into consideration annual data till 
2005. Thus, we show that the problem with the 1980s is not a short-term break of a 
continuous trend, but a complete alteration of the process, a structural change of a 
previously long-lasting convergence into a persisting period of continuous divergence! 
8
                                                 
3 Andriamananjara and Hillberty (2001) also noticed that trade relations with different countries strengthen 
domestic growth, especially when they apply to “third” countries, outside the borders of the area of a regional 
trade agreement regime (like the European Union). Similarly, Wooster et al. (2008) find that trade within the 
countries of EU-13 has less, yet still positive, effect on economic growth compared to the effect from trade 
with non-EU countries. Nevertheless, they do no report a negative effect! Standard theory provide us with a 
range of arguments for why the unconditional, regionally unlimited expansion of trade is preferable compared 
to the one that results within the borders of regional agreements, but it does not necessarily imply a negative 
effect on growth. 
 After presenting the data 
4 Neven and Gouyette (1994), Neven (1995), López-Bazo et al. (1999), Barrios and Strobl (2005), Cappelen et 
al. (2003) and Basile et al. (2001). 
5 Moreover, there are studies that look at the standard deviation of many different measures. For instance, 
Boldrin and Canova (2001) study several indicators, such as labor productivity, income per capita and GDP 
per capita in the EU-15, and find support for the convergence hypothesis. 
6 Giannias et al. (1999), for instance, speak for a convergence process, which is disrupted in the early 1980s. 
7 Neven and Gouyette 1994. 
8 Opposite to Yin et al. (2003), we consider all these countries together, over the whole period (1960-2006), 
regardless the time of accession. Economic and political co-operation evolves always much earlier than the 
official agreement. The reason for not taking all 25 countries is also straightforward: political reasons kept the 
newest members completely apart from the core European Union till the late 1990s.    
    4 
and the methodology, we focus on two distinct questions: Can we observe any convergence 
among the member states? Do we see a narrowing of inequalities, or not? Finally, we 
proceed with a panel regression and we draw the respective conclusions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
For the needs of the present paper, we employ mainly data on real GDP per capita (level 
and the rate of change) and on real wages (real compensation per employee), for EU-15 as a 
whole and for each country-member  as well, in the period 1960-2006. We used the 
database of Eurostat,
9  combined with that of  OECD.
10  Especially for employees’ 
compensation, we used  AMECO database, the annual macro-economic database of the 
European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
11 
Additionally, we also considered data on the annual real GDP growth per capita for the 
world economy as a whole. For that reason, we used the World Development Indicators 
2007 (The World Bank – WDI dataset).
12
Our approach is quite simple, yet it serves the ultimate goal of the present study in a 
satisfactory way. At the end we conclude on some crucial facts and paradoxes, which lead 
to subsequent, more sophisticated questions for further research. The analysis can be 
divided in two parts. In the first part, we try to get some indications regarding the validity 
of projections made by the neoclassical paradigm. Initially, we study the development of 
cross-country inequalities. We estimate the coefficient of variation (standard deviation 
divided by the mean) of real GDP per capita among the different countries of EU-15 and 
the €-area, on an annual basis, and we check the characteristics of the derived time series 
(1960-2006). Similarly, we proceed with analysing σ-convergence for real wages. 
 
Next we consider annual GDP per capita (y) and compensation per employee (w), in real 
terms, in order to look at the broad development of inequalities within each country. We 
use the ratio w/y as an indicator for the degree of evenly distributed income. When w/y 
increases (decreases), real wages become higher (lower) relative to per capita income, 
which means that the labour’s remuneration comes closer (falls behind) to non-labour 
income. Note that, under very specific assumptions, w/y could be seen as an expression for 
elasticity of production with respect to labour. If we assume a quasi perfectly competitive 
labour market, real wage should be equal to the marginal product of labour: w=dY/dL. 
Therefore, w/y could be also written as (dY/dL)/(Y/L).
13
In the second part of the main study, we proceed with a co-integration analysis (Vector 
Error Correction Model), checking in as how much the degree of equal distribution within 
each country (w/y) can be related to the country’s growth rate, governmental spending and 
social expenditures, the country’s degree of openness, as well as its status as an 
EU-member.  
 In that sense, w/y should follow the 
trend of (marginal) productivity of labour. Nevertheless, as we will see in the following 
paragraphs, w/y falls noticeably during the last 25 years, although the tendency of labour 
productivity was undoubtedly positive. 
 
                                                 
9 “European Economy - Annual Economic Report for 1997, No 63, 1997”, European Commission, Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs;  
10 “OECD Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics”, www.oecd.org . 
11 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm  
12 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS  
13 Note that we also consider population to be approximately equal to the sum of workers, L.     
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3. Inequalities and growth dynamic in the European Union 
3.1 Real wage & GDP convergence 
Standard theory declares that as the process of internationalisation evolves, cross-regional 
inequalities fade out. From a static point of view, mainstream trade analysis implies for 
open economies the equalization of factors’ remuneration in real terms. At the same time, 
in terms of a dynamic approach, steady state of all participating economies becomes more 
and more similar. Therefore, convergence is a straightforward conclusion. Does this imply 
for the core of the European Union (EU-15 and €-area)?  
Table A.2 in the appendix provides stationarity tests and trend estimations for the annual 
coefficient of cross-country variation (σ/μ) of real wages per employee (w) and real GDP 
per capita (y), in EU-15 and €-area, for the period 1960-2006. In case of real wages, the 
KPSS-test provides us with a significantly estimated negative trend, meaning a 
convergence tendency. Quite different is the picture  for  σ/μ  of  real  GDP  per  capita: 
especially for the case of EU-15, we have the reproduction of a significant positive trend, 
meaning divergence, with all four different methods.  
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Yet, trend estimations alone can lead us to incomplete conclusions. The picture we get from 
diagrams 2 and 3 is convincing: there are two obviously different periods. In 1960s and 70s, 
a convergence took place for real wages, as well as for per capita income. Yet, from    
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beginning of the 1980s, the picture changes dramatically: the coefficient of variation of w 
shows a noticeable stagnation. In the case of y, starting again from the 1980s, σ/μ rebounds 
and follows an upward tendency of divergence, so strong that the trend we estimated for the 
whole period is slightly positive. Putting all these together, there is an apparent structural 
change after 1980: cross-country inequality starts to rise again, above any previous 
convergences. Using Perron-test, structural change appears in 1982 in all cases, except for 
σ/μ of y in €-area, where structural change is estimated for 1981. 
3.2 Domestic distribution of income  
Recently, OECD published a study saying that economic growth in developed countries 
goes together with a deepening of domestic inequality within the different countries (OECD 
2008). The following diagrams depict the annual development of w/y for the Union as a 
whole (once for EU-15 and then for €-area). As already mentioned, this ratio serves as an 
indicator for the degree of evenly distributed income.  
Diagram 4 confirms the findings of OECD, yet only for the second half of the period: being 
in remarkable conformity with the development of cross-country inequality, domestic 
inequality is getting better only during the first two decades of the period we study. Starting 
from the 1980s, European labourers get a progressively smaller part from produced output. 
Perron test shows also here a significant structural change in the development of w/y around 
1981 (1978 for the case of €-area). 





















4. A closer look into domestic patterns of inequality 
The main message of the above paragraphs is the structural break that took place around the 
beginning of the 1980s: a previous period of converging differences gave place to a 
profound cross country divergence and a worsening of labour’s relative remuneration. 
There is no way to justify this complete alteration of the process by any temporary effect. 
1980-1982 recession or the accession of southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and 
Spain) could be blamed only for short-term breaks of a continuous trend. We suspect that 
the basic underlying reason is the gradual transition of the European free trade area into an 
economic and monetary union, accompanied by the prevalence of a specific policy. In this 
last part of the paper, we take a closer look into cross time development of w/y in each 
EU-15 country, focusing on the following explanatory variables:    
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(wi/yi)t = a +b1gi,t +b2(Ei/Pi)t +b3govi,t +b4soci,t +b5openi,t +c1MSi +c2MTi +c3EUi,t +d1t +e 
where g is the growth rate of real GDP per capita in country i, E/P is the rate of dependent 
employment,
14 gov and soc gives the rate of government spending and social expenditures 
over GDP, open is the country’s degree of openness, MS, MT and EU are dummies showing 
the creation of European Monetary System, the agreement upon Maastricht criteria and the 
country’s accession to EU respectively. Last, t stands for time and e for error term.
15
There are two main difficulties in estimating the above equation: first, there are enough 
reasons for suspecting endogeneity and second, panel unit root tests proved the non-
stationary character of our variables.
 
16 Therefore, after we verified co-integration,
17
The following table provides the estimated coefficients (results of co-integrating equation 
are available by request). Note that we have four different versions depending on the 
inclusion of t and E/P.  
 we 
applied a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) (Greene, 2003).  
Table 1:   VECM estimates – w/y in EU-15 countries, sample (adjusted) 1971-2006
18
Dependent Variable: (wi/yi)t 
 
Explanatory Variables:   Estimated Coefficients (standard errors in small italics) 
Growth rate of real p.c. GDP, gi,t   0,085  -0,090  -0,137  -0,150 
0,086  0,096  0,085  0,097 
Rate of (dependent) employment, Ei/Pit   -  -0,131  -  -0,158 
  0,291    0,294 
Government spending over GDP,  govi,t   -0,181  -0,181  -0,189  -0,193 
0,163  0,171  0,165  0,174 
Social expenditures over GDP, soci,t   0,311  0,330  0,333  0,352 
0,151  0,153  0,152  0,155 
Degree of openness, openi,t   -0,234  -0,239  -0,249  -0,253 
0,100  0,102  0,100  0,104 
European Monetary System (dummy), MSi  -0,028  -0,026  -0,015  -0.012 
0,008  0,009  0,007  0,008 
Maastricht (dummy), MTi   -0,018  -0,019  -0,003  -0,002 
0,006  0,006  0,004  0,004 
EU accession (dummy), EUi,t   -0,007  -0,008  -0,005  -0,005 
0,005  0,005  0,005  0,005 
Time, t  0,001  0,001  -  - 
0,000  0,000     
Adjusted R-squared  0,231  0,214  0,218  -0,193 
F-statistic  12,43  10,13  12,76  9,81 
Mean of Dependent  -0,011  -0,012  -0,011  -0,012 
S.D. of Dependent  0,033  0,033  0,033  0,033 
 
First think to notice is that as real GDP growth strengthens, wages fall stronger behind 
(compared to non-labour income)! The conclusion of OECD for an unequally growing 
economy is being confirmed (in estimations where time is excluded). At the same time, 
degree of openness has a much clearer and stronger negative effect: the more domestic 
production competes with foreigners the less is w/y. This is not surprising, if we consider 
                                                 
14 It is the part of employment rate that refers to employees, after we took out those who are self-employed. 
15 Note that the panel we are using is an unbalanced one. Yet, this should not be a problem, because missing 
observations do not relate to an idiosyncratic, time-varying error. 
16 Unit root tests are available by request. Using ADF-Fisher and PP-Fisher tests and asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution, we found that all variables are stationary in first diff’s, with the exception of g. 
17 Panel co-integration tests are available by request. We used Kao residual co-integration tests based on the 
Akaike and Schwarz criteria. 
18 Provided tests confirm absence of autocorrelation, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity.    
    8 
that European firms compete, among other things, with low-wage economies. Third, 
government spending seems to be completely irrelevant, but, quite opposite, social 
expenditures improve strongly the relative position of labour income. On the contrary, the 
formation of EMU and the agreement upon Maastricht criteria have a significantly negative   
effect (especially when time is included).  
 
5. Conclusions 
In general, the present paper tests the validity of standard theoretical expectations regarding 
the benefits of a more internationalized economic environment, by focusing on the 
historical example of European Union. Member states do not seem to get much from 
participating in a regionally evolving regime of trade agreements and economic integration. 
Apart from the exception of Ireland, €-area grew since 1960 with a gradually smaller rate 
than the world economy. Moreover, in accordance to recent OECD publications, European 
economies’ development goes hand in hand with a deepening of inequality: as the growth 
rate is getting stronger, w/y ratio falls significantly.  
Last but not least, there is clear evidence for a profound structural change regarding the 
distributional patterns that took place in the first half of the 1980s. During the first two 
decades of the period we studied  (1960s and 1970s), both inter-  and intra-regional 
inequality  narrowed:  the  coefficient of variation of  p.c.  GDP  fell  strongly and labour 
remuneration grew substantially relative to non-labour income. This picture changed fully 
after 1980! The previous trend of closing the gap among the countries reversed completely: 
in 2005, coefficient of variation grew back to the levels of 1960. At the same time, all 
previous gains of labour vanished: in the period 1980-2005 real wages lost about 35% 
against p.c. GDP.  
In the last part of this paper we contribute to the discussion regarding the reasons lying 
behind this structural change. In 1974, ECU (European Currency Unit) was defined and on 
the 13th March 1979, European Monetary System (EMS) entered into force, according to 
an agreement celebrated the same day between the central banks of the member-countries. 
Overall empirical conclusions are simply and clear-cut: EMS and “Maastricht” occurred 
just before the emergence of a persisting period of continuous divergence. On the other 
hand, cutting down social expenditures is highly related to the relative worsening of 
labour’s income. In fact, empirical  findings support our main suspicion: the gradual 
transition of the European free trade area into an economic and monetary union, 
accompanied by the prevalence of a specific policy could be one of the main reasons behind 
the period of deepening inequality.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1:  GDP per capita growth by country, in EU-15 and €-area, relative to world 
growth evolves over time. 
 
Stationarity 
Estimation of trend 








§  0.255  -0.040  -1.839




§  0.060  -0.031  -1.711
*  -0.030  -1.807
*  -0.030  -1.807





§  0.054  0.001  0.068  0.001  0.068  0.001  0.068  -0.004  -0.239 
Finland  -2.120  -4.226
§  -4.092




§  0.048  -0.038  -2.629
**  -0.038  -2.629
**  -0.038  -2.629





§  0.253  -0.018  -1.232  -0.018  -1.232  -0.013  -0.875  -0.021  -1.352 
Greece  -2.184  -5.721
§  -5.942
§  0.196
‡  -0.017  -0.479  -0.047  -1.346  -0.047  -1.346  -0.068  -2.081
** 
Ireland  -1.497  -5.094
§  -5.166
§  0.068  0.123  1.613  0.082  2.510
**  0.082  2.510






‡  -0.051  -2.433
**  -0.051  -2.433
**  -0.051  -2.433





§  0.110  0.071  2.071
**  0.071  2.071
**  0.071  2.071
**  0.084  2.759
*** 
Netherlands  -1.672  -5.235
§  -5.243
§  0.084  0.000  0.037  -0.004  -0.268  -0.004  -0.268  0.002  0.139 
Portugal  -1.627  -4.203
§  -4.492
§  0.061  -0.043  -0.967  -0.079  -2.216
**  -0.062  -1.896
















†  0.035  1.917
*  0.033  1.909
*  0.033  1.909









§  0.060  -0.039  -2.849
***  -0.039  -2.849
***  -0.039  -2.849






§ denotes rejection of the 0-hypothesis of unit roots for Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
tests and rejection of the 0-hypothesis of stationarity for the KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) test at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively.   
*, 
** and 
*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table A.2:  σ-convergence of real wages per employee and real GDP p.c. over time 
 
Stationarity 
Estimation of trend 











σ/μ of w (GDP 
deflator)
 19 -1.511    -1.511  -1.570  0.223
§  0.000  1.533  0.000  1.533  0.000  1.533  -0.002  -7.478
*** 
σ/μ of y  
  -2.199  -2.199  -2.210  0.225
§  0.001  5.740
***  0.001  5.740
***  0.001  5.740
***  0.001  2.123
** 













σ/μ of w  
(GDP deflator)
   -1.942  -1.942  -2.099  0.216
§  0.000  0.567  0.000  0.567  0.000  0.567  -0.001  -7.109
*** 
σ/μ of y  
  -2.288  -2.288  -2.255  0.218
§  0.001  5.985
***  0.001  5.985
***  0.001  5.985
***  0.001  2.170
** 









§ denotes rejection of the 0-hypothesis of unit roots for Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
tests and rejection of the 0-hypothesis of stationarity for the KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) test at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively.   
*, 
** and 
*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
                                                 
19 We estimate real wages by deflating the nominal compensation per employee in two ways: once we use 
GDP deflator and then final consumption deflator. Results do not differ significantly.    
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Table A.3:  w/y in EU-15 and the €-area over time. 
 
Stationarity 
Estimation of trend 




(SIC)  PP  KPSS  coefficient  t-statistic  coefficient  t-statistic  coefficient  t-statistic  coefficient  t-statistic 
w/y in EU-15  -1.767  -1.767  -1.660  0.199
‡  -0.001  -2.464
**  -0.001  -2.464
**  -0.001  -3.139
***  -0.003  -5.006
*** 
w/y in €-area  -1.853  -1.757  -1.772  0.195
‡  -0.001  -2.692
**  -0.001  -3.380
***  -0.001  -3.380






§ denotes rejection of the 0-hypothesis of unit roots for Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
tests and rejection of the 0-hypothesis of stationarity for the KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) test at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively.   
*, 
** and 
*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 